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Congress has enacted copyright statutes to satisfy the goal of
the Copyright Clause in the Constitution,1 which is "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." 2 Federal copyright subject matter protects sound
recordings. 3 Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 grants exclusive
rights to the owner of the copyright in a copyrighted work. 4 These
rights originally vest in the author of the work, as long as the work is
not a work for hire. 5 Works made for hire vest in the employer of the
1. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5660.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2000).
4. Id. § 106.
5. Id. § 201.
120 VANDERBILTJ. OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 8:1:119
employee creating the work, or if it is a commissioned work, it can vest
in the commissioning party. 6 If a work is a joint work, the authors are
co-owners of the copyright, 7 or in other words, have a complete and
undivided interest in the work.8
As is true of other copyrightable works, the author or authors
of a sound recording may transfer away some or all of the rights they
have in that sound recording. 9 This is typical for sound recordings.
The rights in the work are most often transferred to the record
company. 10 This transfer of rights can create several problems for
record companies. First, for some types of sound recordings, record
companies fail to have all the performers transfer their rights in the
sound recording. Second, beginning in 2013, authors will be able to
regain the rights to their works.11 Section 203 of the Copyright Act
allows authors to terminate any transfer of rights that they have
transacted.
12
For specific types of sound recordings, this creates an
interesting problem. Large choral works, when recorded, often require
large orchestras and even larger choruses. This creates a situation
where the authors of these sound recordings number in the hundreds.
The copyright issues become particularly interesting where members
of these performing organizations are not employees. It is not
uncommon to find in any given city a large community choir made up
completely of volunteers. Additionally, several well known large
performing choirs are composed entirely of volunteers, including the
Mormon Tabernacle Choir and the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra
Chorus. If the performers in these groups are truly volunteers, how
does it affect the copyright of the sound recordings that they author?
Does the record company get the copyright? Does it vest in the
performers?
The question quickly becomes whether volunteers can create a
work for hire. Normally, the record companies who distribute copies of
these sound recordings have a clause in their contract stating that the
performers have created a work made for hire. 13 The existence of this
6. Id.; see also id. § 101 (defining "work for hire" as including commissioned work).
7. Id. § 201(a).
8. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.03
(Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2004).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
10. See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B][2] [a] [ii].
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (termination may be effected beginning at thirty-five
years from the transfer; thirty-five years from 1978 is 2013).
12. Id.
13. N1MER, supra note 8, § 5.02[B] [2] [a] [ii].
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clause, though, does not make it so. Volunteers do not typically sign
these contracts. Also, volunteers do not fit within the definitions of
what is required to give a work made-for-hire status. Thus, the
volunteers end up being the authors of these sound recordings, and
even if they transfer their rights to the record companies, they may
terminate these transfers after a set time. Is copyright jurisprudence
ready to handle a situation where three and four hundred people own
a copyright in a single work? The copyright code does provide
solutions for this type of situation, but the solution provided may not
be the best one.
This Note discusses how this situation may arise, and it
recommends possible solutions to alleviate it. The first section will
present a brief history of copyright law. The second section will
explain the purpose of the termination of transfers encoded in section
203 of the Copyright Act. The third section will discuss the importance
of the employment relationship between musicians, the organization
in which they perform, and the record companies. This section
includes several examples of performance organizations and analyzes
the employment relationships described above. The last section will
present the copyright concerns in greater detail, including the
historical attempts to solve this problem. Several solutions will be
proposed to solve or mollify the effects of these copyright issues.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT
A. Copyrightable Subject Matter and Sound Recordings
The framers of the Constitution granted Congress the power to
enact laws that would give authors rights to get economic benefits
from the works they created.14 According to the Constitution, Congress
has the power to protect the "writings" of authors, 15 but it did not
define what "writings" were. That job was left to the Supreme Court,
which in one copyright case declared that "no one would now claim
that the word writing in [the copyright] clause of the Constitution,
though the only word used as to subjects in regard to which authors
are to be secured, is limited to the actual script of the author, and
excludes books and all other printed matter."16 This statement showed
that the Copyright Clause was intended to protect more than mere
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Id.
16. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
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words. For example, in Burrow-Giles the Court granted copyright
protection to a lithograph.
17
The subject matter of copyright has been expanded to cover
more and more types of works as new media of expression have been
created.18 In a House Report regarding the Copyright Act of 1976, the
expansion of copyright is expressed:
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of
works accorded protection .... In some of these cases the new expressive forms-
electronic music, filmstrips, and computer programs, for example--could be
regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already
intended to protect ... without the need of new legislation. In other cases, such as
photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory enactment was
deemed necessary to give them full recognition as copyrightable works. 
19
Sound recordings were originally given specific legislative
protection as copyrightable works in 1971.20 A copyrightable sound
recording is any original work21 that "result[s] from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds," not including soundtracks
for movies or other audiovisual works. 22 Congress stated, "[a]s a class
of subject matter, sound recordings are clearly within the scope of the
'writings of an author' capable of protection under the Constitution,
and the extension of limited statutory protection to them was too long
delayed."2
3
B. Rights of Authorship
According to section 201 of the 1976 Copyright Act, all rights
granted copyright protection vest initially in the author of the work.
24
These rights include all those listed in § 106, limited by §§ 107-122.25
17. Id.
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51-52 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5664-65.
19. Id. at 51.
20. Id. at 55.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
22. Id. § 101 (defining "sound recording').
23. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 201; see Lindsay v. R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97-9248, 1999 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 15837, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999).
25. Section 106 specifically lists the rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
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Section 114 specifically limits the rights in the copyright of a sound
recording, reducing them to only subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6) of §
106.26 This means that the owner of a copyright in a sound recording
has the right to make copies (phonorecords) of the sound recording, to
prepare derivative works based on it, to distribute phonorecords of it,
and to perform the sound recording through digital audio
transmission.2
7
In addition to the rights listed in Chapter One of the Copyright
Act, section 201 gives the author the right to transfer "in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law" the rights the
Copyright Act grants originally to the author.28 This means that the
owner of a copyright in a sound recording may transfer, license, sell,
lease, etc., any or all of the rights listed above. 29 Thus, any particular
right the copyright owner wants to part with may be transferred to
another person regardless of the other rights the owner retains, and
the transferee is treated as if he is the copyright owner with respect to
the specific rights he owns in that work.30
When a work is created by more than one author, it is a joint
work. 31 "[A] work is 'joint' if the authors collaborated with each other,
of [sic] if each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the
knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the
contributions of other authors as 'inseparable or interdependent parts
of a unitary whole.' "32 The rights granted to co-authors are the same
as those granted to a single author; "the authors of a joint work are co-
owners of copyright in the work."33 Similarly, "each co-author acquires
an undivided interest in the entire work and has the right to use the
work as he or she pleases."34 Congress has specified:
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
26. Id. § 114(a).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 201(d)(1).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 201(d)(2).
31. Id. § 101 (defining "joint work").
32. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5735-36; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "joint work").
33. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
34. Lindsay v. R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97-9248, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15837, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999).
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There is. . . no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights and
duties of the co-owners of a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed.
... [C]o-owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common,
with each co-owner having an independent right to use or license the use of a work,
subject to a duty of accounting to the other co-owners for any profits.
35
Though it is possible for one person to both perform, record and
master a sound recording, it is common for a sound recording to be a
joint work. 36 Congress stated that:
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually . . . involve
'authorship' both on the part of the performers whose performance is captured and
on the part of the record producer responsible for setting up the recording session,
capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing
them to make the final sound recording.
3 7
C. The Renewal Period
The author is not always in the strongest bargaining position
when he tries to sell his work. 38 Generally, neither the publisher nor
the author knows how well a new work will perform economically.
Nimmer has stated, "[T]he form of property designated copyright,
unlike real property and other forms of personal property, is by its
very nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior to its
exploitation." 39 In order to get some economic benefit out of a work it
is not unusual that the author "sells his copyright outright to a
publisher for a comparatively small sum."40 This is potentially
disadvantageous to the author, because if the work is a success, the
author will not reap any additional economic benefit beyond what the
publisher paid for the copyright.
This concern is what the renewal term was intended to
alleviate. "The renewal term permits the author, originally in a poor
bargaining position, to renegotiate the terms of the grant once the
value of the work has been tested."41 The 1909 Copyright Act provided
that "the author of [a copyrighted] work, if still living . . . shall be
entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a
further term of twenty-eight years."42 Originally the renewal term was
intended to lengthen the term of a copyright beyond the original
35. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121.
36. See id. at 56.
37. Id.
38. See generally NIMMER, supra note 8, § 9.02.
39. Id.
40. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909).
41. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218-19 (1990).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 2005)).
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term. 43 The 1909 Copyright Act provided that the renewal term vested
in the author if he or she was alive at the time the renewal period
began.44 If the author died before the renewal period ensued, then the
statute provided for a list of statutory successors in whom the renewal
right vested.
45
Though the reasons listed above were probably "the most
compelling reason[s] justifying a renewal provision,"46 there were
several other reasons (including sentimental ones) to include a
renewal provision in the copyright code. "The renewal term of
copyright is the law's second chance to the author and his family to
profit from his mental labors."47 "The evident purpose of [the renewal
term] is to provide for the family of the author after his death. Since
the author cannot assign his family's renewal rights, [it] takes the
form of a compulsory bequest of the copyright to the designated
persons."48 "There are at least sentimental reasons for believing that
Congress may have intended that the author, who according to
tradition receives but little for his work, and afterwards sees large
profits made out of it by publishers, should later in life be brought into
his kingdom."49 One last (perhaps facetious) suggestion for a renewal
term is that "authors are congenitally irresponsible, that frequently
they are so sorely pressed for funds that they are willing to sell their
work for a mere pittance .... ,,50
Though contrary to the reasoning above, it was (and still is)
possible for an author to sell or assign his interest in the renewal
term. 51 According to the Supreme Court, "the Copyright Act of 1909
does not nullify agreements by authors to assign their renewal
interests."52 Additionally, the Court has stated: "If an author cannot
make an effective assignment of his renewal, it may be worthless to
him when he is most in need. Nobody would pay an author for
43. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 217.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1974) (amended by 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24
(2000)).
45. Id. (including the author's widow(er) and children, executor, and next of kin as
statutory successors).
46. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 9.02.
47. Seymour M. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23,
27 (1955).
48. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956).
49. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 251 (1st Cir. 1911).
50. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000) (allowing for a renewal period for works in their first
copyright term before 1978). The Stewart analysis applies to these works the same as to
works already in their renewal period before the 1976 act was introduced. See Stewart v
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217-18 (1990).
52. Fred Fisher Music, 318 U.S. at 657.
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something he cannot sell."53 But courts took a strict interpretation of
what was required to transfer the renewal rights of an author: "The
cases are clear that a copyright renewal creates a separate interest
distinct from the original copyright and that a general transfer by an
author of the original copyright without mention of renewal rights
conveys no interest in the renewal rights without proof of a contrary
intention."
54
Lastly, even though the author could transfer his right in the
renewal period (if he does so explicitly as required by case law), the
author has to be alive at the time the renewal period arises in order
for this transfer to be valid.55 The Supreme Court in Stewart v. Abend
stated that it previously had
[H]eld that when an author dies before the renewal period arrives, his [statutory
successor] is entitled to the renewal rights, even though the author previously
assigned his renewal rights to another party. "An assignment by an author of his
renewal rights made before the original copyright expires is valid against the
world, if the author is alive at the commencement of the renewal period .... These
results follow not because the author's assignment is invalid but because he had
only an expectancy to assign; and his death, prior to the renewal period,
terminates his interest in the renewal which by § 24 vests in the named classes."
56
The 1976 Copyright Act retains the renewal rights for all works
in their original copyright term and created before January 1, 1978.57
It also retains the statutory successors from the 1909 Act. 58 Though
the renewal period is longer,59 the foregoing analysis still applies to
renewal periods that occur after the January 1, 1978 deadline.
II. TERMINATION OF TRANSFERS
When the 1976 Copyright Act was passed into law, Congress
changed the copyright term such that there was no renewal term.6 0
For works created on or after January 1, 1978, copyright subsisted in
53. Id.
54. Marks Music Corp. v. Harris Music Publ'g, 255 F.2d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 1958)
(citing G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951)).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1974) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (West Supp. 2005)).
56. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 219 (quoting Miller Music v Charlie N. Daniels, 362 U.S.
373, 375 (1960)); see also Miller Music, 362 U.S. at 375 ("The right to obtain a renewal
copyright and the renewal copyright itself exist only by reason of the Act and are derived
solely and directly from it.").
57. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000).
58. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2005) (naming the author's widow,
widower, children, executors, or next of kin as statutory successors), with 17 U.S.C. § 24
(1974) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (West Supp. 2005))(same).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (West Supp. 2005) (extended renewal term of 67 years from 28
years).
60. See generally id. § 302.
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the owner for a single term of the author's life plus 50 years.61 The
Sonny Bono Copyright Terms Extension Act later expanded the
copyright term to the author's life plus 70 years.
62
With the dismantling of the renewal term, Congress needed a
way to provide for the author "who according to tradition receives but
little for his work, and afterwards sees large profits made out of it by
publishers, [to] later in life be brought into his kingdom."63 Congress
did this by enacting 17 U.S.C. § 203. "The provisions of section 203 are
based on the premise that the reversionary provisions of the present
section on copyright renewal (17 U.S.C. § 24) should be eliminated,
and that [§ 203] should substitute for them a provision safeguarding
authors against unremunerative transfers."
64
This code section, entitled "Termination of transfers and
licenses granted by the author,"65 effectively gives similar rights to the
author as those of the renewal period. Thus, an author can terminate
and return to himself any transfer of copyright in which he has
engaged.6 6 The author must do this within a specified period of time
from execution of the grant, generally thirty-five years from the
execution of the transfer.
67
Congress had several reasons to discontinue the renewal
system:
[T]he renewal structure was found to be an unsatisfactory means of achieving
reversion for authors. It is procedurally clumsy and difficult. The fact that
reversion under the renewal system is tied to the term of copyright creates a real
possibility that works will be injected into the public domain by reason of an
inadvertent failure to renew.
68
The termination provision enacted as part of the 1976
Copyright Act is an attempt to solve the problems of the renewal
period structure "while at the same time achieving a reversion of
rights."6 9
61. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 133-38 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748-54 (noting an important reason for the change was to bring
United States copyright law into line with the requirements of the Berne Convention).
62. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298 § 102, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified as amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)).
63. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 251 (1st Cir. 1911).
64. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 203.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 203(a)(3).
68. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 11.01.
69. Id.
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III. EMPLOYMENT AND COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
To establish whether the creator of a work is the owner of the
copyright in that work, it must be established whether or not that
person created a "work made for hire." The "work made for hire"
concept is an exception to the general rule that copyright vests in the
author of a work. Section 201 of the copyright code states:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
70
Thus, the person who creates a work made for hire does not get
the copyright in the work (it does not vest in them), and as Nimmer
points out, the "termination [of transfer] provisions are not applicable
to works made for hire."71 If a work made for hire is created by an
employee, it will be protected as a work made for hire (meaning that
the employer will own the copyright) unless there is a signed writing
stating otherwise. 72 If a work made for hire is created by a contractor,
then in addition to the other requirements discussed below, there
must be a signed writing that the work is to be treated as a work for
hire, without which the copyright vests in the contractor, and not the
commissioning party.
73
In order to determine whether a work is a work made for hire,
one must apply the definition given in § 101, which has two parts. A
work may be a work for hire when the person creating it is an
employee. Also, under the appropriate circumstances, a work may be
a work for hire when the person creating it is a contractor.
A. Work Prepared by Employees
Section 101 defines a work for hire as "a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment." 74 However, the
statute does not define when one is an employee. This question has
been taken up by the courts many times, and it seems to be answered
most definitively (with respect to copyright) in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.75 In that case, Community for Creative
Non-Violence ("CCNV') asked Reid, a sculptor, to create a sculpture
70. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
71. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[A].
72. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
73. Id. § 101.
74. Id. § 101 (definition of "work made for hire").
75. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
2005] SOUND RECORDINGS OF VOLUNTEER PERFORMERS 129
representing a homeless family sitting over a steam grate. 76 When
disputes later arose over who owned the copyright in the sculpture,
the Supreme Court had to decide whether or not Reid was an
employee of CCNV. 77 The Court, applying the general common law of
agency, listed 13 factors to consider in determining whether Reid was
employed by CCNV. 78 Though the Court gave no direction regarding
how to weigh these factors (other than simply stating that none of the
factors is determinative), it found that Reid was not an employee of
CCNV. 79 Instead, he was considered an independent contractor.
80
Several cases have wrestled with these factors since Reid. In
1992, the Second Circuit noted:
It does not necessarily follow that because no one factor is dispositive all factors
are equally important, or indeed that all factors will have relevance in every case.
... In contrast, there are some factors that will he [sic] significant in virtually
every situation. These include: (1) the hiring party's right to control the manner
and means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits;
(4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party. These factors will almost
always be relevant and should be given more weight in the analysis, because they
will usually be highly probative of the true nature of the employment
relationship.
8 1
76. Id. at 733.
77. Id. at 735.
78. The thirteen factors are:
1) The hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished
2) The skill required
3) The source of the instrumentalities and tools
4) The location of the work
5) The duration of the relationship between the parties
6) Whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party
7) The extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work
8) The method of payment
9) The hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants
10) Whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party
11) Whether the hiring party is in business
12) The provision of employee benefits
13) The tax treatment of the hired party
Id. at 751-52.
79. Id. at 752.
80. Id.
81. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
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The Second Circuit further emphasized the importance of the
provision of employee benefits and the tax treatment of the hired
party by stating, "[t]he importance of these two factors is underscored
by the fact that every case since Reid that has applied the test has
found the hired party to be an independent contractor where the
hiring party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes."
8 2
Three years later, the Second Circuit confirmed this reading of Reid
by finding that sculptors who had received benefits and whose
paychecks had taxes removed from them were in fact employees, and
therefore they had created a work made for hire.
8 3
The Reid test is not the only test to determine employment
status. In Dumas v. Gommerman, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[o]nly
the works of formal, salaried employees are covered by section
101(1)."84 Though this concept of employment was disapproved of by
Reid,8 5 it is still a compelling argument. Nimmer suggests that there
has been a "resurrection of the Ninth Circuit's Dumas rule that only
'formal, salaried employees' qualify under the work for hire
doctrine."8
6
B. Works Prepared by Contractors
The second part of the definition of a "work for hire" in § 101
delineates when a work created by a contractor will be considered a
work made for hire. There, Congress limited works made for hire to
nine specific types of works.8 7 If the work contracted for does not fall
under one of these nine categories, then the work is not a work made
for hire, and the copyright vests initially in the author (the creator,
who is generally the non-commissioned party). It may not be readily
apparent why this part of § 101 applies to this discussion, because
sound recordings, except those accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, are not among the nine categories. Nimmer
suggests that sound recordings are an "obvious candidate" for the
82. Id. at 863.
83. See generally Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
84. 865 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1989).
85. See generally Reid, 490 U.S. 730.
86. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B][1] [a] [iii].
87. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (stating that a work made for hire is: "A work specially
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas,
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire.").
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enumerated list found in § 101.88 Congress must have agreed, because
they added (and quickly removed) sound recordings to the list in § 101.
In 1999, Congress passed the Satellite Home Viewer
Improvement Act. According to Nimmer, Congress "stealthily" added
sound recordings to the list of works protected as works made for
hire8 9 (a not too unreasonable assertion, considering the name of the
act and how this addition lacks any relation to it). It appears that this
portion of the bill was added at the last minute, because it was not
included in any previous drafts.90 There was a great deal of criticism
to the addition of sound recordings to the list of commissioned works
protectable as works for hire. There was so much criticism that less
than a year later, Congress passed the Work Made for Hire and
Copyright Corrections Act which removed sound recordings from the
list of items protected under § 101.91 Not only did Congress try to
remove sound recordings from the purview of § 101, Congress added
language to the definition of "works made for hire" such that neither
the addition nor the later deletion of sound recordings from that
section "shall be considered or otherwise given any legal
significance." 92 As stated by Nimmer:
Wishing to avoid any imputation that the repeal itself connoted a substantive
choice of policy, Congress expressed itself as neutrally as possible. As a
consequence, the statutory provision regarding commissioned works is to be
interpreted as if both the 1999 amendment and its 2000 repeal "were never
enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness by the Congress at any
time of any judicial determinations."
9 3
Why is the determination of whether a sound recording is a
work made for hire important? It has been noted that "virtually all
contracts that artists signed with record companies from 1972
onwards have contained acknowledgments that their contributions
constitute works for hire. In addition, those same contracts typically
contain a backup assignment. '94 This backup assignment usually says
that if the work made for hire language is not effective, the authors of
the sound recording transfer their interest in the copyright to the
record company. 95 Whether it is a work for hire or an assignment,
ultimately the record company owns the copyright in the sound




92. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
93. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B] [2] [a] [ii].
94. Id.
95. Interview with Robin Mitchell Joyce, Member, Bass, Berry & Sims PLC, in
Nashville, Tenn. (Feb. 10, 2005).
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recording. The difference, then, is in the ability to terminate the
transfer of ownership in the copyright. As noted previously, copyright
in a work made for hire vests with the employer or commissioning
party (if there is a signed writing).96 If an artist makes a sound
recording that is not protected as a work made for hire, then the
record company will only own the copyright in the work by
assignment, and the assignment may be terminated regardless of any
contractual language to the contrary. 97 Thus, beginning in 2013,98 the
determination of whether a sound recording is a work made for hire
becomes important, particularly if there are a large number of people
who helped to create the work. This leads to a discussion of whether
performers in large ensembles will be considered employees for
determining copyright ownership.
C. Examples and Analysis
In order to discuss in whom a copyright initially vests for sound
recordings, it will be helpful to discuss several examples. These next
few sections will discuss several ensembles that make sound
recordings. There will be an introduction to each of the ensembles
discussed, a discussion of how they are organized, the employment
status of the recording artists, the nature of the relationship with the
record companies, and the copyright status of the works recorded.
1. The Nashville Symphony Orchestra
The Nashville Symphony Orchestra (NSO) is gaining a strong
reputation as a nationally prominent orchestra because of its
Grammy-nominated recordings. The NSO has a recording agreement
with Naxos, 99 a small record label founded in 1987 which has grown
into a worldwide classical label. Since 2000 Naxos has released seven
albums by the NSO. °00  The NSO is conducted by Kenneth
Schermerhorn and currently has eighty-two musicians. 10 The NSO's
recording agreements and practices are a good representation of the
96. See 17 U.S.C. § 201.
97. Id. § 203(a)(5).
98. This is the first year in which authors may begin to terminate transfers of their
copyright interests (thirty-five years from 1978). See id. § 203(a)(3); NIMMER, supra note 8,
§ 5.03[B][2][a][ii].
99. Telephone Interview with Mark Blakeman, General Manager and Vice
President, Nashville Symphony Orchestra (Jan. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Blakeman].
100. Nashville Symphony, Recordings, http://www.nashvillesymphony.org/concerts
/recordings.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
101. Blakeman, supra note 99.
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standard copyright practice for large orchestras in the United States
(though there are some minor variations, which will be noted later).
When the NSO makes a sound recording, in whom do the
rights to that sound recording initially vest? It can be assumed that
the creators of the sound recording would be considered authors for
the purpose of the copyright code. 10 2 These authors would likely
include the sound recording engineers, the conductor, and the
musicians as performers of the music recorded (whom we will focus
on). Unless the sound recording is a work made for hire, copyright
vests in these performers. Of the two ways to create a work made for
hire, we will assume that sound recordings do not fall into the nine
categories in § 101. This leaves the issue of whether the musicians are
employees creating a work within the scope of their employment.
103
Members of the NSO are full time, salaried, unionized musicians. 10 4 It
is likely that with this description of employment, members of the
NSO would meet the minimal employment test suggested by Aymes,
and certainly the employment standard set by Dumas. But who are
they employed by? They are employees of the NSO, and not of Naxos.
Does this present a problem for the work for hire status of the works?
Not necessarily. As with most orchestras in the United States, the
members of the NSO are also members of the American Federation of
Musicians (AFM), whose collective bargaining agreement governs the
terms of the recording contracts that orchestras make with record
labels.105 These contracts in turn agree that for the sake of recording
purposes, the musicians' work will be works made for hire for whoever
signs the contract (usually the record company).10 6
Naxos presents an odd case, because Naxos refuses to recognize
the AFM agreement. 107 As a solution to this problem, the Nashville
Symphony Association (NSA) becomes a signatory to the AFM
agreement, and both the AFM and Naxos are satisfied. 08 Because the
musicians are employees creating the sound recording as part of their
employment, the rights in the sound recordings that the NSO makes
do not vest initially in the musicians. The sound recordings are works
for hire. Since Naxos does not recognize the AFM agreement, it cannot
be the employer for whom the musicians are working. This is different
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
103. See id. § 101 (defining "work made for hire").
104. Blakeman, supra note 99.
105. Id.
106. Interview with W. Michael Milom, Partner, Bass, Berry & Sims PLC, in
Nashville, Tenn. (Jan. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Milom].
107. Blakeman, supra note 99.
108. Id.
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from record companies who do recognize the AFM contract: the
musicians would technically be working for the record company while
recording music, and so the rights in the sound recording would vest
initially in the record company. Since Naxos doesn't recognize the
contract with the AFM musicians, whoever is a signatory must own
the copyright because he is the employer. In this case, that would be
the NSA. Therefore the NSA must transfer its interest in the
copyright to Naxos.
As recipient of the rights in a work made for hire, Naxos has
control of the copyright for ninety-five years from publication of the
work. 10 9 Also, because the sound recording is a work made for hire, the
creators of the sound recording (which includes the musicians of the
orchestra) do not have the right to terminate their transfer of
copyright, 110 because no such transfer ever took place. Naxos owns the
copyright subject only to the NSA's right to terminate the transfer. If
the NSA chooses not to terminate, then it is as if Naxos owns the
copyright outright and may use the copyright as it wishes for the
duration of the ninety-five years.
This situation is typical for most sound recordings made by
orchestras in the US. There are several large recording ensembles,
though, whose organization predicts a different result for copyright
ownership. Two well known examples follow.
2. The Mormon Tabernacle Choir
The Mormon Tabernacle Choir (MTC) is a world renowned
choir based in Salt Lake City, Utah. The choir has around 360
members" and has performed with the Philadelphia Orchestra and
the Utah Symphony.11 2 In 1999 the Orchestra at Temple Square was
formed and now performs with the choir whenever an orchestra is
needed. 11 3 The MTC has performed at the inauguration of five U.S.
presidents, several World's Fairs, 114 and has a weekly radio broadcast
entitled "Music and the Spoken Word," which was started in 1929.115
109. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
110. See Id.
111. Mormon Tabernacle Choir, Information, http://www.mormontabernaclechoir
.org/info! (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
112. Mormon Tabernacle Choir, The Orchestra at Temple Square, http:!www.
mormontabernaclechoir.org/orchestra/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
113. Id.
114. See Mormon Tabernacle Choir, supra note 111.
115. Mormon Tabernacle Choir, Music and the Spoken Word, http://www.
mormontabernaclechoir.org/info/matsw (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
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According to one discography, 116 the choir has recorded at least 106
published recordings since 1910.117 The MTC has made at least fifty-
three recordings since 1978.118
The MTC is composed of volunteer musicians, as is the
Orchestra at Temple Square.11 9 Though several of the members of the
choir and orchestra are professional musicians, no member of the
choir considers performing with the choir a job. Most of the members
have full time jobs and participate in the choir as a secondary
interest. 120 Though it appears that the members of the choir are not
likely employees of the MTC, an analysis would be helpful to prove the
likelihood of that assertion.
Though members of the choir are not paid, do they receive any
compensation? For every local performance, members of the choir get
free tickets.1 21 This, though, does not amount to much, because all
tickets for home performances of the choir are free. 122 When the choir
performs on tour, no free tickets are given, regardless of how much the
tickets cost.1 23 Choir members do not receive free copies of their sound
recordings, but may purchase them at a discounted rate.1 24 In
contrast, the MTC pays for all travel arrangements for its members
when the choir goes on tour (but does not pay for family of choir
members who travel with the choir). The MTC also provides the music
and the costumes for members, 25 although these are likely considered
loans because they must be returned. Therefore, the members of the
MTC receive little to no reimbursement for their services, likely not
enough to meet the standard from Reid, and certainly not the
"salaried" employee standard from Dumas. Since the members of the
choir receive no benefits and also receive no tax benefits (tax benefits
are neither paid for by the choir nor likely even possible by being a
116. This discography was recommended by Scott Barrick, the general manager of the
MTC. According to Barrick, the information in this discography could be used in the future
to make an official discography. Telephone Interview with Scott Barrick, General Manager,
Mormon Tabernacle Choir (Jan. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Barrick].
117. Russell B. Josephson, Salt Lake Mormon Tabernacle Choir Discography,
http://www.josephsons.org/slmtc/mtcrec.htm (last updated Apr. 9, 2005).
118. Id.
119. Mormon Tabernacle Choir, Around the World With America's Choir,
http://www.mormontabernaclechoir.org/info/item?itemid=3 (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
120. See Mormon Tabernacle Choir, Becoming a Member of the Choir,
http://www.mormontabernaclechoir.org/info/item?itemid=2 (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
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member of the choir),126 Aymes would dictate that choir members are
not employees.
Applying the rest of the Reid factors also leads to the
conclusion that MTC members are not employees. There is much skill
required in performing a choral work. Most of the recordings are made
at the Tabernacle, where the MTC rehearses and performs, or some
other site designated by the choir. Though on average members
perform with the choir for nine or ten years, 127 membership is
voluntary and can be terminated at any time. The MTC has practice
every Thursday and Sunday (and some Tuesdays), and members need
only maintain a seventy-five percent attendance record. 128 The MTC
itself is not in the business of making sound recordings; it considers
itself a religious organization, 129 and performances and sound
recordings are secondary interests. Perhaps the most important
consideration is that the choir itself considers its members to be
volunteers and not employees. 130 It is not likely that choir members
will ever be considered employees, either for copyright or any other
purpose. An analysis of whether the choir members are employees of
the record company that publishes the sound recordings produces the
same results.
It is interesting, then, that though the members of the MTC
are not employees for the scope of the sound recording, the record
company should consider the sound recording a work for hire. As
earlier stated, most record companies insert "boilerplate language in
all recording contracts which specified that the sound recordings were
works for hire."1 31 The contracts that the MTC made with record
companies (including CBS, Columbia, Sony, ABC Records, and
London) 132 stipulated that the sound recordings were works made for
hire.1 33 This becomes stranger considering that the recording
companies had very little to do with the sound recording at all.
According to the general manager of the MTC, the recording
companies had little more than a "concurring role" in deciding what
music was recorded. Though several of the recording company's
126. Id.
127. Barrick, supra note 116.
128. Mormon Tabernacle Choir, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.mormontabernaclechoir.org/faq (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
129. Members of the choir are required to be members of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints (aka Mormon). See Mormon Tabernacle Choir, supra note 120.
130. See Mormon Tabernacle Choir, supra note 119.
131. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[BI[2][a][ii].
132. See Josephson, supra note 117 (providing a more complete list of record labels
that the MTC has worked with).
133. Barrick, supra note 116.
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employees may have worked on the sound recording, the choir, the
choir members, the conductor and the accompanist are not employees
of the record company. It would appear that except for any recordings
made during the small period between 1999 and 2000 (the brief period
where sound recordings could be considered a work for hire if made by
a contractor), the sound recordings made by the choir are not and
cannot be protected as works made for hire. The rights in the sound
recordings must vest initially in the authors, who are the musicians.
The record companies must receive their rights in the sound recording
through transfer.
As it stands, the MTC accepts that the record companies own
the copyright in the sound recording.1 34 The general manager of the
MTC stated that in the past, the record company got the copyright in
the sound recording, and in order to solve this problem, the MTC
formed its own record label in 2003.135 It is not likely that this will
have the result that the MTC wants, because the problem remains:
the copyright "vests initially in the author or authors of the work" 136 or
the artists who perform the piece recorded. Unless the members of the
choir transfer their copyright interest, the "copyright" that the record
company holds will not be as useful as the company believes. The
copyright in the sound recordings the MTC creates likely vests in the
three to five hundred musicians and others who are joint authors in
the work. This might be very disconcerting to both the record
companies and the MTC itself, now that it has its own record label.
3. The Atlanta Symphony Orchestra and Chorus
The Atlanta Symphony Orchestra (ASO) and Chorus (ASOC)
have together gathered an impressive number of awards and
commendations. Sound recordings produced by the ASO and ASOC
have won thirteen Grammy Awards; most of the sound recordings that
the ASO makes feature the ASOC.1 37 The ASOC was founded in 1970
by the late Robert Shaw, who brought the ASO and ASOC into
prominence. 138 The ASOC is composed of 200 members,1 39 and the
ASO itself has ninety-five musicians.1 40 Together, the ASO and ASOC
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
137. Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, http://www.asochorus.org/ (last visited Oct. 5,
2005).
138. Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, Meet the ASO,
http://www.atlantasymphony.org/meet/chorus.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
139. See Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, supra note 137.
140. TELARC, Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, http://www.telarc.coml/biography/
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have produced around 43 albums, most of which have been distributed
on the Telarc label.
4 1
The copyright issues regarding the sound recordings of the
ASO and ASOC are similar to those of the MTC, but the differences
merit some note, beginning with the organization of the ASO. The
ASOC was added to the ASO in 1970, as an ancillary group to the
orchestra. Though the members of the orchestra are salaried,
unionized musicians, 142 the chorus itself is made up entirely of
volunteers. 143 Applying the Reid test, it is unlikely that the chorus
members could be considered employees (the results are the same as
for the members of the MTC), and applying the Dumas test of "formal,
salaried" employment, as volunteers, members of the ASOC cannot be
considered employees. This creates a dichotomy: volunteer singers
who create a work that vests initially in themselves and professional
orchestral musicians who create the same work, but as a work made
for hire it vests initially in Telarc.
Though this situation seems novel, it is not difficult to imagine
it happening in other media. Imagine a freelance writer creating the
text to a play, and the production company who wants to turn it into a
musical has its in-house arranger/composer work with the writer to
transform it. Or in a situation similar to Reid, a corporation who hires
an artist to create a sculpture, and the artist creates a joint work with
a designer from the corporation assigned to assist in the project. In
both of these situations, a joint work is created where one of the
creators gets the copyright in the work, whereas the other was
creating the work as part of the scope of his employment, and thus
that author's portion of the copyright vests in his employer as a work
made for hire.
This may seem an odd set of circumstances, but it does not
alter the result. Telarc's contract with the ASO states that Telarc
receives the copyright in the sound recording. 44 For the members of
the orchestra, this makes sense. They have created a work that, under
their contracts with the AFM, is a work for hire, and so the copyright
that would have initially fallen to them now vests in Telarc. But for
bios.asp?aid=2&mscssid=WlNV6CBX1Q689LH5GB7JO8GDK7P3FP87 (last visited Oct. 5,
2005).
141. Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, ASOC Discography, http://www.asochorus.org/
Discography.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2005); see also Telephone Interview with John
Sparrow, Vice President and General Manager, Atlanta Symphony Orchestra (Jan. 5,
2005).
142. Telephone interview with Jeff Baxter, Choral Administrator, Atlanta Symphony
Orchestra (Jan. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Baxter].
143. See Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, supra note 137.
144. Baxter, supra note 142.
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the members of the choir, who are more than twice as many in
number as the orchestra members, the portion of copyright that would
have fallen to them is also assumed to be owned by Telarc, and likely
called a work made for hire by the sound recording contract. The
result is the same as for the members of the MTC. If the individual
members of the choir signed over their rights to Telarc, then Telarc
has control over those rights for at least thirty-five years, after which
the members of the choir may terminate that transfer. If they did not
sign any agreement concerning copyright, either with the ASO or
Telarc, then Telarc is controlling a copyright that neither statutorily
vested nor contractually transferred to them.
IV. PROBLEM AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Identification of Problems
The examples given above present two possible scenarios for
copyright ownership of sound recordings. The first possibility is that
volunteer performers have signed no contract, and have become
authors of a sound recording by doing something they enjoy. Though
contracts between the orchestra/choir organizations and the record
companies may discuss copyright, the members have not signed these
contracts, and are not a party to them.145 Thus, the copyright initially
vests in them as joint authors. In the second situation, these voluntary
or otherwise non-employed musicians have signed contracts that
transfer their rights for the sound recording to the record company.
But this transfer can be terminated after thirty-five years under the
1976 Copyright Act. 146 Thus, if the authors are ambitious, they can
return ownership in the copyright to themselves. The result of both of
these situations is that members of large recording ensembles that are
not employees have rights in the copyright that the record company
generally believes it controls.
145. For example, members of the MTC sign a "commitment sheet" with the choir.
This commitment sheet is not a copyright release, and likely does not grant the MTC the
power to transfer the performers' rights to the record company. The choir members also do
not sign, nor have they in recent memory signed any contract or copyright transfer with the
record company. See E-mail from Scott Barrick, General Manager, Mormon Tabernacle
Choir, to Stephen Adams (Jan. 18, 2005) (on file with the author).
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2000).
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1. Rights of Co-Authors
Why is this a matter for concern? Several of the performing
groups cited above have recorded albums that have produced
significant amounts of money. 147 The performers as authors have
rights in the copyright, which means that the record company is
accountable for part of its earnings to these performers, separately
from whatever agreement is reached between the record company and
the performance organization. Nimmer has stated the issue this way:
In an early case, it was held that one joint owner of a work need not account to
the other joint owner for the profits obtained by the former in using the work. This
rule might be justified .... Nevertheless, this rule has almost without exception
been rejected in modern decisions, so that the prevailing rule is that a joint owner
is under a duty to account to the other joint owners of the work for a ratable [sic]
share of the profits realized in the work. 148
Thus, each author of the work, barring an agreement to the
contrary, owns his proportionate interest in the work (1/total-number-
of-authors interest).149 In essence, just because the copyright in the
sound recording may be registered in the name of the record company,
that does not relieve the record company of accountability to the other
joint authors.
The consent to take out the copyright in the name of one does not destroy the
interest of the others, who have jointly labored with the applicant for such
copyrighted [work].
* . , Where two or more persons have a common interest in a property, equity
will not allow one to appropriate it exclusively to himself, or to impair its worth as
to others. 
1 50
According to this logic, each of the members of a chorus or
orchestra is an author of a work who should receive their
proportionate amount from the income derived from the work. This,
though, would be disastrous to the royalties agreement between the
record company and the performance organization. Additionally, this
may be prohibitively expensive to coordinate and perhaps even
impossible to accomplish for recording groups that border on 500
musicians or their statutory successors.
In a similar vein, the exclusive rights that the sound recording
company believed it owned solely (by virtue of the work made for hire
147. For example, five recordings by the Mormon Tabernacle Choir have reached
"gold record" status, and two have reached "platinum record" status. See Mormon
Tabernacle Choir, supra note 111.
148. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 6.12[A].
149. Id. at § 6.08.
150. Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1921).
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status) are now jointly owned by a large group of individuals. Each of
these individuals not only has the option to exercise any of the rights
listed in § 106, but also has the right to transfer a non-exclusive
license to any other person who wants to exercise these rights.
"Because one joint owner cannot be liable for copyright infringement
to another joint owner . . . it follows that a joint owner may, without
obtaining the consent of the other joint owners, either exploit the work
himself, or grant a nonexclusive license to third parties."151 In addition
to licensing, the "ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole
or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law ....
As this simply states, any of these authors could sell or license their
part of the copyright, allowing any person who purchases such a
license to sell phonorecords of the sound recording, possibly over-
saturating the market.
2. Difficulties of Volunteers to obtain their rights
Note that it is possible that the situation described above may
never arise. No member of a volunteer performing association may
ever try to collect the remuneration that federal statutes provide for.
If a volunteer does transfer his rights, he may not remember or may
not care enough to terminate that transfer. Additionally he may have
passed away and his family may not know anything about his rights.
If all the members of a performing organization transfer their interest
as a group, it could be a difficult task to find a majority of the group to
terminate the transfer thirty-five years later.153
Though these problems make it difficult to conceive that any
volunteer or group of volunteers would attempt to sue for their rights
in a sound recording, it is not impossible. For example, the MTC has a
webpage that lists all of its current and former members.154 The ASOC
has a web page, accessible only to members of the chorus, which lists
information about the members. 155 Armed with this information, it
would be possible to contact a majority of the performers and begin
the process to terminate the transfer (which could be as simple as
sending a letter explaining the situation, and which the member could
sign and return).
151. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 6.10.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2000).
153. See id. § 203 (requiring a majority of people who signed away their rights to
terminate the transfer).
154. Mormon Tabernacle Choir, Historical Roster,
http://www.mormontabernaclechoir.org/roster/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
155. Baxter, supra note 142.
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A second concern is the loyalty of members of volunteer
performing organizations. Members of the MTC commit to give many
hours for performances and practice, and some do so for up to twenty
years. Some members of the ASOC have been with the group since its
inception in 1970, and others travel from as far away as Tennessee to
perform with the group. These examples show a good deal of
commitment to these performance organizations. Such commitment
might be used by the organization to have members sign their
copyright interest to the organization instead of the record company,
which might shift the balance of power for negotiations. This problem
could be solved in the future by having the members sign transfers to
the record company, the benefits of which will be discussed below.
B. Suggested solutions
1. Pre-emptive solutions
The first thing that should be done where sound recordings are
being made is to contract for the copyright. If the copyright in the
sound recording is intended to remain with the record company, then
care should be taken to make sure that it is wholly owned by the
record company in the first place. This means that every musician,
whether volunteer or professional, employed or not, should sign a
statement transferring whatever interest he may have to the record
company. This is recommended not only for sound recordings by well
known recording ensembles, but for every sound recording of a large
or small ensemble (whether the sound recording will be for sale or
not). 156 This also prevents the problem mentioned earlier of members
of performing ensembles from transferring their rights to the
performance organization instead of the record company. Though this
may seem a harsh measure, especially for high school bands or choirs,
it is simple to implement. This requires nothing more than having the
performers sign a form when they arrive for the recording session.
Having performers sign a transfer is only a temporary solution
because these transfers may be terminated. A recommendation that
will make it more difficult to terminate the transfer to the record
company is to have every musician sign the same agreement. If each
individual author signs a separate agreement, then that author may
simply terminate his agreement and his portion of copyright returns
156. See, Milom, supra 106 (stating that he recommends signing such an agreement
to every recording ensemble who consults him, whether the sound recording be made by a
professional group, a church, or school).
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to him.157 If the authors sign one agreement, a majority of authors are
required to terminate such a transfer, 158 making it significantly more
difficult to terminate that transfer.
This solution, though not infallible, provides the record
company at least thirty-five years of breathing room. If a termination
is not effected, then ultimately the record company will enjoy a full
term of copyright in the sound recording.
5 9
2. Statutory solutions
There are two possible statutory solutions to the problem: re-
insert sound recordings into the categories of commissioned works
protected as works made for hire, or "shoehorn" sound recordings into
one of the various categories.
Enacting legislation that would again include sound recordings
as works made for hire might be the optimal solution. As required in §
101, this would require that the creator of the work and
commissioning party sign a statement agreeing that the work is a
work made for hire. 60 If this requirement were satisfied (seeing as
how there is no requirement for remuneration in the statute), it is
logical to suppose that the record company will be considered the
author for copyright purposes.' 6' The volunteers could then neither
sue for their portion of the income from exploiting the work, nor
terminate the transfer, since the copyright never vested in them.
162
It should be noted that this solution is not a probable one.
Noting how quickly Congress repealed the inclusion of sound
recordings as a category in § 101 (less than a year after the inclusion
was enacted), 163 it is unlikely that another attempt to pass such a law
will happen without a large fight. Nor is it likely that musicians will
let Congress slip the law in almost secretly, as was done previously.
An alternate solution, then, is to use the categories currently
listed in § 101, and try to fit sound recordings within one of them. As
157. Id.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1).
159. This situation brings up interesting questions: if two authors create a joint work,
one whose efforts create a work for hire vesting in his employer, when does the copyright
end? Does it end when the work for hire term of the copyright ends, or does it end fifty
years after the non-work-for-hire author dies? If the company and an author own the work,
does the company's protection in the work end at the time the work-for-hire protection
ends, or when the other author's protection ends, and vice-versa? Though academically
interesting, these questions are outside the scope of this note.
160. Id. § 101 (defining "work made for hire").
161. Id. § 201(b).
162. See id. § 201(a).
163. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii].
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Nimmer puts it, "[i]t simply means that, for a work to qualify [for
protection as a work made for hire], it must be shoe-horned within one
of the other categories."'164 Nimmer's discussion of this proposition is
more than satisfactory, and it is recommended that the interested
reader peruse it to discover the multiple facets of this argument.
Making sound recordings works for hire through this method seems
like the optimal solution, but shoe-horning sound recordings into other
categories will not necessarily work. One of the possible categories
that sound recordings could fit into is the "contribution to a collective
work".16 5 This category may be broad enough to cover such works as
Christmas music albums, 166 patriotic songs, or hymns, which may
contain many different songs and selections from more than one sound
recording (these types of albums make up a large percentage of the
MTC's output). 167 It is not likely broad enough, though, to cover an
album which has a single work on it. It is typical, for example, to have
on one compact disc a complete recording of Beethoven's Ninth
Symphony, and nothing else. 68 For the other § 101 categories that one
is tempted to shoehorn sound recordings into, one will find similarly
that not all sound recordings will fit and ultimately many sound
recordings will not fit in any category. Additionally, though this
solution may be tempting for many sound recordings, without the
signed writing required by § 101, it will not be useful at all.
3. Other solutions
A very simple solution is to do nothing. Sound recordings have
been made by groups like the MTC and ASOC since 1978 when the
new Copyright Act went into effect. There is no record of any member
of the MTC or ASOC suing a record label to account for their portion
of the income from the sound recording. It does not seem very likely
that volunteer members are going to do so, either, because of their
interest and commitment to the organization to which they belong.
This solution must also be fair to the record companies. If no one sues
them, they are as well off as if they owned the copyright outright. If a
member of these performing organizations does sue the record
companies, since it may be assumed that record companies have
greater bargaining power and larger legal resources than volunteer
164. Id. § 5.03[B][2][a][ii].
165. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work made for hire").
166. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B] [2] [a] [ii].
167. See Josephson, supra note 117.
168. See Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, supra note 141 (showing that this type of
album makes up a large percentage of those that the ASOC puts out).
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musicians, it may also be assumed that they understood the law and
took their chances. Record companies cannot rely on the presumption
that because the contract with the performing organization states that
the sound recording is a work for hire169 that it is actually a work
made for hire. Though possibly detrimental to the record company, it
is equitable in light of their decision to not secure the copyright from
the authors.
One solution more beneficial to record companies deals with
the authorship of the sound recordings. An idea not suggested by case
law is that a court interested in preserving the status quo could
determine that the author/s of the sound recording are not the
individual performers, but the entire performing organization as a
whole. This solution could simplify the process: it would eliminate the
need to have volunteer performers sign agreements transferring their
rights, and existing contracts between the organizations and the
record companies could easily include transfers of the copyright
(which might not be necessary if the work made for hire clause in
these contracts was valid or acted as a transfer). There are several
external criteria that already suggest this solution. One is the albums
themselves: most albums do not contain the name of every musician
who performed to make the sound recording; typically, they have the
name of the orchestra, the conductor, any soloists, and the names of
recording engineers and the like. Another is the nature of the
contracts for the sound recording: they are between the organization
and the record company, not between the performers and the record
company. Those performers who wanted to be named had the right to
contract with or petition the record company; their failure to do so
may act as an estoppel to claim either copyright or their portion of the
income. If necessary, it could be guided by the criteria that suggest it.
Those who have a copyright are those named on the album or in the
contracts. All others could be presumed to have understood that
failing to request recompense or recognition at the time of recording
barred them from doing so in the future.
This solution would require courts to change the concept of
authorship, but as authorship is already a court created doctrine
(there is no definition for what an author is in § 101 of the Copyright
Code), it is also modifiable by courts. It is also a matter of proof.
Without a list of members of the choir accompanying the compact disc,
it will be difficult to prove that any particular performer participated
in the recording.
169. This is a typical situation. See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 5.03[B] [2] [a] [ii].
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V. CONCLUSION
As the copyright code stands, it is unlikely that volunteers
performing on sound recordings will lose their rights in the sound
recording to the record company as works made for hire. Volunteering
does not meet the court-created standards for employment under Reid,
its variant Aymes, or under Dumas. Also, if the works are
commissioned works, they cannot be protected as works for hire
because sound recordings are not one of the listed categories under §
101.
Since the sound recordings made by these groups are not works
made for hire, the copyright vests initially in the authors. Though
these authors may sign away their rights to the copyright, this does
not always happen. Even if the authors do transfer their rights in the
sound recording, they or their statutory heirs may simply terminate
this transfer within thirty-five years.
The code, then, provides that each of these authors (the
number of which could reach into the hundreds on any particular
sound recording) is entitled to their portion of the income that the
sound recording makes. This income invariably does not go to these
performers; it goes to the record company, and possibly a portion of it
goes to the performing ensemble organization. Should any performer
decide to sue, they would likely win whatever portion of the income
that is statutorily theirs. The end result is that record companies
could decide to simply stop using volunteer ensembles or decide to not
distribute these recordings at all.
This problem has several solutions. The optimal solution for
the record company is to petition Congress to make sound recordings
protectable as a commissioned work made for hire. This could alleviate
the problem of volunteer performers not counting as employees. An
amendment of this sort is not likely to happen considering the outcry
that was raised the last time Congress enacted this sort of legislation.
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The second best option, the easiest to put into practice proactively, is
to require each member of the performing ensemble, whether
voluntary or not, to sign a statement transferring their interest in the
copyright to the record company. This would give the company at least
thirty-five years of temporary relief, and if no one terminates their
transfer, permanent control of the copyright. The record company
should provide a single document that every performer is required to
sign. This increases the difficulty of termination over multiple
documents which each performer signs separately, because a majority
is required to terminate a transfer. This practice could solve a host of
future problems, and barring new legislation, is the most logical
approach.
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